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International Accountability in the Implementation of the Right to Development and the 
“Wonderful Artificiality” of Law: An African Perspective  
Obiora C. Okafor* and Uchechukwu Ngwaba** 
Abstract 
The landscape for the implementation of the right to development has undergone significant 
transformative shifts with the recent establishment of a new expert mechanism on the right to 
development by the UN Human Rights Council, and the finalisation of a draft treaty on the right 
to development. Yet, much more can clearly still be done to strengthen UN, state and non-state 
actors thinking on accountability in the implementation of the right to development, to add to the 
already considerable progress that has taken place. Our paper explores what can be done, focusing 
on the African and international context. We conclude that by reflecting on the benefits which a 
greater focus on accountability in UN development thinking post-2015 can bring to the table, the 
chances of success of the right to development is heightened.     
 
I. Introduction 
If the report of the High-Level Panel on the post-2015 Development Agenda and the Sustainable 
Development Goals adopted by the United Nations were anything to go by, then the 
implementation of the “right to development”1was supposedly poised to take centre stage in the 
international human rights agenda post-2015.1 By many accounts, this was a significant and 
dramatic turn of events considering the antecedents of this right as an agenda championed by 
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1 See A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development, 
(hereafter “the High Level Panel Report” or “the report”) (2013), online: <http:www.post2015hlp.org/the-report>. On 
these UN Sustainable Development Goals, see The United Nations, “Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform,” 
(visited on 13 January 2016), online: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/>.; and Obiora C. Okafor, “The SDGs 
and Africa” Global Brief Magazine (Fall 2015), online: <https://globalbrief.ca/2015/10/for-africa-the-new-
sustainable-development-goals-sdgs/>. 
“jurists from the South and contested by jurists from the North”.2 The adoption in 1986 by the UN 
General Assembly of the Declaration on the Right to Development (DRD)3 was a defining moment 
for the right as it paved way for its widespread recognition4 - although the vagueness of the DRD 
greatly fuelled jurisprudential speculations on its basis and applicability.5 The DRD was not well-
received by many states in the North.6 Scholars and policy makers from the North and South 
pitched tent in opposite camps debating the “subjects and objects”7 of the right. Real progress 
towards widespread recognition of the right only began following its reaffirmation in subsequent 
international instruments (such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992,8 
and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action 19939) and series of intergovernmental 
conferences.10 The international human rights community marked the third decade of the DRD in 
 
2 See Russel Lawrence Barsh, “The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of the Global Consultation” 
(1991) 13:3 Hum Rts Q 322 (“Barsh”); and Bonny Ibhawoh, “The Right to Development: The Politics and Polemics 
of Power and Resistance” (2011) 33 Hum Rts Q 76 at 77 (“Ibhawoh”).   
3 Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Doc A/RES/41/128 (4 December 1986) (hereafter “the Declaration”). 
4 Arjun Sengupta, “On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development” (2002) 24:4 Hum Rts Q 837 at 840-841.  
5 James C.N. Paul, “The Human Right to Development: Its Meaning and Importance” (1992) 11:(1/2) Third World 
Legal Stud 17; Supra note 3.  
6 When the DRD was adopted by a majority of the UN General Assembly several countries (mostly from the North) 
abstained, while the United States cast the sole dissenting vote. The abstaining countries were: Denmark, Finland, The 
Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Four countries which did not 
vote include: Albania, Dominica, South Africa, and Vanuatu. In the third committee vote on the Declaration (draft 
resolution U.N. Doc A/C.3/41/L.4) Norway also abstained (see U.N. Doc. A/C/3/41/SR.61). See also supra note 4 at 
840.  
7 See Barsh, supra note 2 at 323; See Ibhawoh, supra note 2 at 87; Upendra Baxi, Mambrino’s Helmet: Human Rights 
for a Changing World (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1994); Yash P. Ghai & Y.K. Pao, Whose Human Right 
to Development? (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989); Jack Donelly, “Human Rights, Democracy, and Development” 
(1999) 21:3 Hum Rts Q 608.   
8 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (visited on 6 November 2015), online: Principle 3 
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163/>. 
9 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993: 
UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (12 July 1993) (hereafter “Vienna Declaration”) Art. 10. 
10 The right to development has been recognized as a human right at many international conferences since the Vienna 
Declaration: At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, it was stated “the right to 
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet the population, development and environment needs of present 
and future generations” (see A/CONF.171/13: Report of the ICPD (94/10/18); The report from the 1995 World 
Summit for Social Development mentioned that “the international community should promote effective international 
cooperation, supporting the efforts of developing countries, for the full realization of the right to development and 
elimination of obstacles to development, through, inter alia, the implementation of the provisions of the Declaration 
on the Right to Development as reaffirmed by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action” (A/CONF.166/9 
(19 April 1995)); The Platform for Action at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women “reaffirm[ed] that all 
human rights – civil, cultural, economic, political and social, including the right to development – are universal, 
2016. Since then, the landscape for the implementation of the right to development has undergone 
a number of significant changes. Most notably in this regard is the recent establishment of a new 
Expert Mechanism on the right to development by the UN Human Rights Council, and the 
finalisation of a draft treaty on the right to development.11     
Yet, much more can clearly be done to strengthen UN, state and non-state actors thinking 
on accountability in the implementation of the right to development, to add to the already 
considerable progress that has taken place. Our paper sets out to explore what can be done, 
focusing on the African and international context. The African context is particularly important as 
Article 22 of the African Charter12 guarantees the right to development, and stands out as “...one 
of the precious few hard law guarantees of a right to development...in the realm of international 
human rights.”13 In furtherance of our objective(s), we advance three arguments along the way.  
 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, as expressed in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted 
by the World Conference on Human Rights” (See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (visited on 7 November 
2015), online (pdf): <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf>); The 1996 World Food 
Summit emphasized the need for “democracy and the promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the right to development and the full and equal participation of men and women as essential 
determinants of success in achieving sustainable food security for all” (see World Food Summit (visited on 7 
November 2015), online <http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.HTM>); The report from the Second 
United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in 1996 stated that “while the significance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the 
duty of all States to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to 
development” (A/CONF.165/14 (7 August 1996)); and at the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, the report affirmed “the solemn commitment of all States to 
promote universal respect for, and observance and protection of, all human rights, economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political, including the right to development, as a fundamental factor in the prevention and elimination of racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance” (see World Conference against Racism, Racial 
“Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance” (visited on 7 November 2015), online (pdf): 
<http://www.un.org/WCAR/durban.pdf>.    
11 See UN HRC, “Human Rights Council Closes Forty-Second Regular Session, Adopts 38 Texts, Establishes a Fact-
Finding Mission on Venezuela and an Expert Mechanism on the Right to Development” (visited on 3 April 2020), 
reliefweb, online: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/human-rights-council-closes-forty-second-regular-session-
adopts-38-texts-establishes>; See also The right to development (A/HRC/39/L.12); and Draft Convention on the right 
to development (A/HRC/WG.2/21/2).  
12 See the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Dco. CAB/LEC/67/3 Rev. 
521 I.L.M. 58 (1982) entered into force on October 21, 1986 (hereafter the “African Charter”).   
13 See Obiora C. Okafor, “‘Righting’ the Right to Development: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Art. 22 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Stephen Marks (ed) Implementing the Right to Development: The Role of 
Firstly, we claim that not enough appears to have been done by states in the African human rights 
system (both individually and collectively) to bring about the realization of the right to 
development envisaged by Article 22 of the African Charter. This shortcoming, we argue, is 
largely the result of the inadequacy in the workings (and not necessarily in the structure or design) 
of the accountability mechanisms of the right to development in the praxis of the African human 
rights system.      
Secondly, we argue that the tenet of international accountability in the implementation of 
the right to development is often refracted to suit the different agendas of different actors – national 
and international. The national and international actors involved in the implementation of the right 
to development tend to elide obligations to be accountable while demanding accountability of 
others. This argument applies in two ways: first to national actors in the South engaged in the 
debate on the priority of the right to development in the global political economy; and second to 
national and international actors in the North involved in development work in the South who often 
demand transparency, accountability and good governance from Southern states but seldom 
observe these standards in their encounters with Southern states.    
Thirdly, we apply Martti Koskenniemi’s “wonderful artificiality” thesis14 to the treatment 
of the right to development in international law. We argue in this regard that there is a spectrum 
of legal norms, from soft law, through a number of in-between forms of law, to hard law which 
 
International Law (Geneva: FES, 2008) at 52; Art. 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States accords 
the right to development to the state and obligates the state (in the pursuit of this right) to respect the rights of the 
individual and the principles of universal morality. See Dante M. Negro, “Article 17 and Chapter VII of the Revised 
OAS Charter and Relevant Experience of OAS Institutions” in Stephen Marks (ed) Implementing the Right to 
Development: The Role of International Law (Geneva: FES, 2008) at 64 (“Negro”); the OAS Charter provision 
contrasts with Art. 22 of the African Charter which accords the right to development to the individual and obligates 
states to individually and collectively ensure the exercise of this right.        
14 For an exposition of this thesis see Part V of this article. 
can be deployed in service of the implementation of the right to development in a transparent and 
accountable manner. Whilst not discounting the imperative need for hard law in the realization of 
the right to development (and indeed whilst extolling its virtues in the current context and pushing 
for its robust incorporation into the struggle to realize the right to development), we argue in favour 
of the value that the technically non-binding DRD may still bring to the table, despite its status as 
a non-hard law text.15 The point here is that like most international lawyers who work in this area, 
we accept that there is a spectrum of bindingness of legal norms and that, although hard 
international law must be deployed to the task at hand if it is to be achieved, even those norms that 
are low in that traditional “hierarchy” can still be useful in the struggle.  
Following the above arguments, we conclude that by reflecting on the benefits which a 
greater focus on accountability in UN development thinking post-2015 can bring to the table, the 
chances of success of the right to development is heightened.  
II. The Right to Development: Reflections on Recent Changes  
Two critical and related events signal the modest but important changes that have occurred in the 
context of the right to development in the last several years. The first is the publication (on 30 May 
2013) of the High Level Panel Report (hereinafter “the HLPR”)  calling upon the UN, its member-
states, regional organizations, civil society and all concerned, to make what its authors refer to as 
“five big transformative shifts,”16 namely: move from reducing to ending poverty (with no one left 
behind); put sustainability at the core of development; transform economies for jobs and inclusive 
 
15 See Obiora C. Okafor, "The Status and Effect of the Right to Development in Contemporary International Law: 
Towards a South-North Entente" (1995) 7 African J of Intl and Comparative L 865. 
16 See the Executive Summary of the High Panel Report, supra note 1. 
growth; build peace, as well as effective, open and accountable institutions for all; and forge a new 
global partnership (based at least in part on mutual accountability).17  
The second critical event was the need to fill the development-vacuum created when the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) expired at the end of 2015. Admittedly, the 
implementation of the MDGs did record remarkable successes in reducing poverty, child death 
rates, and deaths from malaria etc. However, there were a number of shortcomings with the 
implementation of those goals; deficits which are highlighted in the HLPR: 
“They did not focus enough on reaching the very poorest and most excluded people. 
They were silent on the devastating effects of conflict and violence on development. 
The importance to development of good governance and institutions that guarantee 
the rule of law, free speech and open and accountable government was not included, 
nor the need for inclusive growth to provide jobs. Most seriously, the MDGs fell 
short by not integrating the economic, social, and environmental aspects of 
sustainable development as envisaged in the Millennium Declaration, and by not 
addressing the need to promote sustainable patterns of consumption and 
production. The result was that environment and development were never properly 
brought together. People were working hard – but often separately – on interlinked 
problems.”18          
The HLPR, and the UN Secretary-General’s report which followed drew attention to what was 
already known – that there was a need to develop a new paradigm of development for the post-
2015 period.19  In the ideation of this new paradigm, the authors of the HLPR warned that 
“business-as-usual is not an option”.20 Thus, their recommendation of five big transformative shifts 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See A Life of Dignity for all: Accelerating Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and Advancing the 
United Nations Development Agenda beyond 2015, Report of the Secretary-General, A/68/202, 26 July 2013 
(hereafter “the UN Secretary-General’s report”). 
20 See the Executive Summary of the High Panel Report, supra note 1. 
was a significant departure from the incremental approach to development favoured by the 
MDGs.21  
To this end, Paragraph 75 of the UN Secretary-General’s report, which itself was based on the 
HLPR, stated firmly that if the kind of “sustainable development agenda” that the Secretary-
General desires is to “take root”, there is a need to establish “a participatory monitoring framework 
for tracking progress” and “mutual accountability mechanisms for all stakeholders”.22 Paragraph 
81 of the same report spoke to the need to “ensure that the international community is equipped 
with the right institutions and tools for addressing the challenges of implementing the sustainable 
development agenda at the national level.”23 Paragraph 95 then stated quite interestingly that: 
“Sustainable development cannot be fully realized without respect for human rights 
and the rule of law. Transparency and accountability are powerful tools for ensuring 
citizens involvement in policymaking and their oversight of the use of public 
resources, including to prevent waste and corruption. Legal empowerment...can 
also be critical for gaining access to public services.”24 
Thus, the idea that “everyone involved (in the development process the world over) must be fully 
accountable” appeared at that point to have a central (and even critical) place in UN thinking about 
the ways and means of advancing the development agenda post-2015.25 However, it also appears 
 
21 Paul Nelson argues for instance that “[t]he MDGs are a careful restatement of poverty-related development 
challenges, in language that avoids reference to rights; they are a donor country interpretation of the key issues, for a 
donor-country audience.” By contrast, “rights-based approaches…seek to link the development enterprise to social 
movements’ demands for human rights and inclusion, and to tie development to the rhetorical and legal power of 
internationally recognized human rights.” See Paul J. Nelson, “Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals, 
and the Future of Development Cooperation” (2007) 35:12 World Development 2041-42 (“Nelson”); see also Charles 
Mutasa, “The Politics of the Millennium Development Goals in Africa: Is Global Partnership Really Working?” 
(2005) 6:1 Sustainable Development L & Policy 21 (“Mutasa”).  
22 Supra note 19. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 One of the criticisms leveled against the MDGs is the absence of “meaningful accountability mechanisms”. While 
the MDGs “call for greater generosity by the rich countries and commitment by the poor countries...they introduce no 
mechanism for accountability by either.” Supra note 21 (Nelson) at 2046; although MDG advocates would argue in 
favour of its capacity to strengthen accountability, the meaning of that accountability is rarely clarified. For instance, 
Fukuda-Parr argues that “the MDGs are a global commitment and a framework of accountability…MDGs are more 
that the conception of accountability that had been espoused in these two UN documents was a 
very limited one. For one, it appears that it was limited by its near-entire focus on accountability 
at the national level. Not nearly as much was said about the role of good governance on the 
international plane in fostering the kind of mutual accountability that is envisaged. Despite this 
slight shortfall, it did seem like a measure of careful thought went into considering the role that 
the international rule of law could play in fostering the desired level of mutual accountability. 
From the “monitoring and peer review mechanisms”26 proposed by the HLPR to the “participatory 
monitoring frameworks for tracking progress” and “mutual accountability mechanisms for all 
stakeholders”27 suggested by the Secretary General, the UN appeared at this point to have been on 
the right (albeit quite modest) path in its desire to embed living forms of accountability in 
international development thought and practice post-2015.  
Disappointingly, to say the least, the (eventually adopted) Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), the end-product of the process that produced the above thinking, failed to include any 
meaningful mechanisms for holding the relevant actors accountable for delivering on the resources 
without which almost all of those ambitious goals cannot be achieved. Instead, the SDG document 
is filled with now quite tired and historically less than effective platitudes about the need for greater 
international partnerships in realising the right to development, including presumably across the 
South-North axis.  Such mere platitudes have rarely if ever convinced, let alone cajoled or even 
forced states, to deliver on their ambitious promises to provide the capital, technology, market 
 
powerful tools than mere UN declarations because time limits and quantifiable outcomes, by which progress can be 
objectively measured and monitored, are specified. They provide a framework for accountability at local, national, 
and international levels.” See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, “Millennium Development Goals: Why they Matter” (2004) 10:4 
Global Governance 395 at 397.      
26 Supra note 1 at 21. 
27 Supra note 19 at 12. 
access, and human resources to the African and other countries of the Global South which may 
need them.  
The recent establishment of a new Expert Mechanism on the right to development (noted 
in Section I above) and the finalisation of a draft treaty on the right to development suggests that 
a measure of gradual change is occurring  in the international human rights system. Yet, it cannot 
be completely ignored that support for these measures have largely come from the Global South, 
and that – on the formal level within the United Nations – these changes have been almost entirely 
driven by Global South states. If, and when, the draft treaty on the right to development is adopted 
by the UN system (as is likely to be the case), it will largely be on account of the considerable 
majority of the voting bloc of the Global South in the UN General Assembly, rather a genuine 
embrace of the right by  Global North states and the international institutions they  control. 
Regardless, it should be emphasised that many Global North citizens and civil society actors do 
strongly support these measures.  
III The African Human Rights System, the Right to Development and the Accountability 
Question       
 
Notwithstanding the controversy about the status of the right to development on the international 
plane, it is a legally binding human and peoples’ right in the context of the African human rights 
system. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,28 the “constitutional” document of 
that system, guarantees for all peoples “...the right to their economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the 
 
28 See the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 (1982) 21 I.L.M. 59 (hereinafter “the African Charter” 
or the “Charter”). For a study of this charter and its implementation, see Obiora C. Okafor, The African Human Rights 
System, Activist Forces and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
common heritage of mankind.”29  The African Charter further imposes upon its states parties, 
“...the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.”30 
These provisions make groups of human beings (peoples), and not the state, the direct subjects of 
the right to development and impose a duty on the state, individually or collectively with other 
states, to ensure the fulfilment of that right. This approach has not always been followed elsewhere 
in the world. For example, in the Charter of the Organization of American States (as opposed to in 
the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) where a similar right is 
guaranteed,31 the right to development is couched as that of the state, which in turn has a duty to 
respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality.32 
To what extent then have the guarantees of the right to development in the African Charter 
translated into the realization of that right within its states parties? Are there mechanisms in the 
African human rights system through which states can individually or collectively be held 
accountable for the (non)fulfilment of the right to development? If such mechanisms exist, how 
robust and effective are they? 
(a) The Fulfilment of the Right to Development in the African System 
 An increasingly settled proposition in the literature is that the right to development straddles four 
dimensions: the national dimension; the international dimension; the collective, group, or peoples 
 
29 Ibid, Art. 22(1) African Charter. For an in-depth analysis of the meaning, relevance and implementation of this 
provision, see Obiora C. Okafor, “A Regional Perspective: Article 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights” in Realizing the Right to Development: Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Right to Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2013) at 373. 
30 Ibid, Art. 22(2) African Charter. 
31 Negro however argues that the emphasis of the OAS Charter is “…less on the right to develop and more on the right 
to develop freely and naturally.” See Negro supra note 13 at 69. 
32 Art. 17 of the OAS Charter reads: “Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely 
and naturally. In this free development, the State shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal 
morality.” See Charter of the Organization of American States (visited on 14 November 2015), online (pdf): 
<http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.pdf>. 
dimension; and the stand alone or composite dimension.33 Each of these dimensions is critical to 
the fulfilment of the right. However, under the theoretical and practical framework of the DRD, it 
is in its national dimension that the right takes root and comes to fruition. This is because the DRD 
regards the state as the primary site within which the fulfilment of the right to development is to 
occur.34 This is not to argue, of course, that the sub-state group (i.e. a people) cannot claim or enjoy 
the right to development. Far be it – especially in the context of the African system where the 
African Commission courts has settled the question in favour of such peoples.35 As such, states 
are expected to ensure the realization of the right to development for its peoples – including for 
specific sub-state groups –through the enactment and implementation of adequate constitutional, 
policy/legislative and judicial safeguards/measures. 
The critical importance of paying heed to the international dimension of the right to 
development is largely justified by “the interconnectedness of national economies due to 
globalization and regionalization.”36 The DRD itself contemplates this fact; hence, it provides for 
the individual and collective duty of states to fulfil the right to development.37 The individual and 
collective dimension of the extant right acknowledges the dual character of the right to 
development as a right which empowers human beings and states as beneficiaries (or subjects) of 
the right.38 Sengupta rightly observes that the classification of this right as a collective right opens 
 
33 Serges A.D. Kamga & Charles M. Fombad, “A Critical Review of the Jurisprudence of the African Commission on 
the Right to Development” (2013) 57:2 J Afr L 196 at 203.   
34 Supra note 3, see Art. 3(1) of the Declaration which reads as follows: “States have the primary responsibility for 
the creation of national and international conditions favourable for the realization of the right to development.”     
35 Supra note 29.  
36 Supra note 33.  
37 Supra note 3; In this regard, Art. 4(1) of the Declarations provides that: “States have the duty to take steps, 
individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full 
realization of the right to development.”  
38 The Declaration recognizes the collective right of peoples in Article 1 “…to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realized.” However these collective rights are not to be seen as opposed to or superior to, the right of the individual, 
it up to persistent criticism by First World critics. However, “it is perfectly logical to press for 
collective rights to be recognized as human rights. Care must, however, be taken to define 
collective rights properly and not in opposition to individual rights per se.”39 There is thus an 
integral relationship between the collective and individual human rights approach to development. 
Hence in 1979, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution No. 5 (XXXV) stating 
“that the right to development is a human right and that equality of opportunity is as much a 
prerogative of nations as of individuals within nations.”40   
Finally, the stand alone or composite dimension of the right to development highlights the 
indivisibility, interdependence, and interconnectedness of all human rights.41 As a composite 
human right, the right to development “comprises civil, political and socio-economic rights. It 
comprises the human rights principles of equality, non-discrimination, participation, transparency 
and accountability as well as international cooperation.”42            
All in all, it bears some repetition to note here again that it is at the national level that action 
is expected to commence for the fulfilment of the right to development, even though the 
international and other dimensions of the right are equally important for its fulfilment. In the 
context of the African system where the African Charter guarantees the right, states within that 
system have the primary duty of adopting the necessary constitutional, policy/legislative and 
 
indeed  Art. 2 contemplates that “the human person is the central subject of development and should be the active 
participant and beneficiary of the right to development.” See also supra note 4 at 862. 
39 Supra note 4 at 862. 
40 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Supp. No. 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1347 (1979).  
41 Art. 5 of the Vienna Declaration sums up this understanding as follows: “All human rights are universal, indivisible 
and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis….” See supra note 10. 
42  Supra note 33 at 204. 
judicial measures to bring about its fulfilment.43 As such, the enquiry whether the guarantees in 
the African Charter have been translated into the realization of the right to development for 
individuals in member states is one that requires the examination of the situation of that right in 
each of the member states that have acceded to the African Charter. As meaningful as that level of 
scrutiny will be for our analysis in this paper, space constraints severely limit us. As such, our 
focus will shift more towards analysing the availability, robustness, and effectiveness of 
mechanisms in the African human rights system for giving bite to the hard law guarantee of the 
right to development in the African Charter.              
(b) Accountability for the Realization of the Right to Development in the African Human 
Rights System   
That mechanisms abound in the African human rights system through which states can be held to 
account for the fulfilment of the right to development (and other human rights contained in the 
African Charter) is not a matter for debate. What is debatable is the robustness and effectiveness 
of such mechanisms. As such, this section aims, first, to identify the mechanisms in the African 
human rights system for holding states accountable for the fulfilment of the right to development; 
and second, to analyse the robustness and effectiveness of such mechanisms. 
(i) Accountability Mechanisms      
Through a combination of periodic reporting,44 the creation by the African Commission of 
subsidiary mechanisms (such as the system of rapporteurships, committees and working groups),45 
 
43 See Clive Baldwin & Cynthia Morel “Group Rights” in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds) The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights – The System in Practice, 1986-2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) at 244 at 270.  
44 See Art. 62 of the African Charter, supra note 12; See also Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (hereafter “Rules of Procedure 2010”) (visited on 17 November 2015), 
online (pdf): <http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/rules_of_procedure_2010_en.pdf>. 
45 Ibid, Rule 23(1) Rules of Procedure 2010. 
the Communications (i.e. petitions) procedure of the African Commission,46 and judicial scrutiny 
by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter “the African Court”),47 member 
states of the African human rights system can – to a significant degree – be held to account for the 
realization or failure to realize the various human rights contained in the African Charter and other 
human rights treaties in that system (including the right to development). The next section offers 
a critique of the robustness and effectiveness of these mechanisms.  
 (ii) Robustness, Effectiveness and Critique  
A tidy way of considering the mechanisms for accountability in the African human rights system 
is to classify them into two broad categories: the relatively non-contentious and the generally 
contentious accountability mechanisms. The relatively non-contentious mechanisms include the 
submission of periodic reports, the system of rapporteurships, committees and working groups. 
While the generally contentious mechanisms include the Communications procedure of the 
African Commission and the assumption of jurisdiction by the African Court for human rights 
violations brought before it. 
The relatively non-contentious mechanisms   
Article 62 of the African Charter and Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure 2010 obligate state parties’ 
to submit periodic reports every two years to the African Commission on “...the measures they 
have taken to give effect to the provisions of the African Charter and on the progress they have 
 
46 See Art. 47, 48, 49 and 55 of the African Charter, supra note 12; see also supra note 44, Rules 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 
and 88 of the Rules of Procedure 2010.  
47 Art. 3 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Right (hereafter “Protocol of the African Court”) (visited on 17 November 2015), online (pdf): 
<http://en.african-court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/africancourt-humanrights.pdf>. 
made.”48 The African Charter goes as far as specifying that the report is to reflect “...the legislative 
or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed by the...Charter.”49 Assuming compliance with this obligation is a measure of the 
extent of accountability for the implementation of the right to development (and other human 
rights) in the African system, then the situation (i.e. the picture of the process of holding states to 
account through this means) appears to be somewhat disappointing. This is because out of the 54 
African states that have ratified the African Charter50 only five states are up to date with their 
reporting obligations: 12 states are late by one or two reports; 31 states are late by three or more 
reports; and 7 states have not submitted any report.51  
However, one must note that compliance with reporting obligations by states is hardly a 
measure of the extent of their accountability for the implementation of the right to development. 
This is because even in respect of those states which are up-to-date in the submission of their 
reports, doubts remain about the optimal effectiveness of the entire process and whether it amounts 
to what Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking have aptly described as the observance of “rituals 
and ritualism.”52 The African Commission itself once bore  this out in its frank assessment of its 
reporting system, observing that: 
 
48 Supra note 44, see Rule 73 Rules of Procedure 2010.  
49 Supra note 12, see Art 62 African Charter.  
50 South Sudan which gained its independence from Sudan in 2011 is the latest African State to have ratified the 
African Charter. See “Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (visited on 28 March 2020), 
online: <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/>; The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a 
partially recognized defacto sovereign state claiming the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara which has 
also ratified the African Charter. But for the purpose of our analysis here, it is not a fully recognized state in the AU 
system. 
51 See “State Reporting Map” (visited on 28 March 2020), online: <http://www.achpr.org/states/>. 
52 They make this critique in respect of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism of the UN system which they argue 
may sometimes lend itself to the mere observance by states of the ritual and ritualism of state reporting without any 
meaningful impact to the situation of human rights in their domestic systems. See Hillary Charlesworth and Emma 
Larking (ed) Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
“The State reporting system of the African Commission is still in its [relative] 
infancy. Unlike the UN Human Rights Committee, the African Commission 
examines very few reports during each of its sessions. To develop this system 
further, the Commission would need the cooperation of States, NGOs and civil 
society.”53              
With regards to the other aspects of the non-contentious mechanisms, namely, the system of 
rapporteurships, committees and working groups, it is telling that till date, no Special Rapporteur 
mandate on the right to development has been established by the African Commission to monitor 
the situation of the implementation of the right to development.54 This may, in a way, reflect the 
relative priority (or lack thereof) that the African Commission has so far accorded to the right to 
development; and this despite its path-breaking interpretive work in relation to this same right. 
Equally so, no Working Group or Committee has been established on the right to development. 
The generally contentious mechanisms   
The generally contentious mechanisms include communications submitted to the African 
Commission, and the assumption of jurisdiction by the African Court over cases brought before it. 
For reasons that will become clear as the discussion unfolds, the jurisdiction of the African Court 
will first be treated before a consideration of the jurisprudence of the African Commission on the 
right to development.  
The rules governing the jurisdiction of the Court are contained in the Protocol of the 
African Court. Article 3 thereof says the Court has jurisdiction over “...all cases and disputes 
 
53 See “State Reporting Procedure” (visited on 28 March 2020), online: <http://www.achpr.org/states/reporting-
procedure/>. 
54 Since 1996 to date, five Special Rapporteur mandates have so far been created by the African Commission as 
follows: Special Rapporteur on Prisons, Conditions of Detention and Policing in Africa (1996); Special Rapporteur 
on Rights of Women (1999); Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (2004); Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders (2004); Special Rapporteurs on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and 
Internally Displaced Persons (2004). See “Special Mechanisms” (visited on 19 November 2015), online: 
<http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/>. 
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any 
other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.”55 Article 5 prescribes 
the rules on access to the Court, restricting access to the Commission; a state party which has 
lodged a complaint to the Commission; a state party against which a complaint has been lodged at 
the Commission; a state party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation; and an African 
Intergovernmental Organization.56 As importantly, Article 34(6) provides that: 
“At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State shall 
make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under 
article 5(3) of this Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under article 
5(3) involving a State Party which has not made such a declaration.”    
As at March 2020, only 30 out of 54 African states have ratified the Protocol of the African Court. 
Out of this number, only nine states have deposited a declaration in conformity with Article 
34(6).57 For states that have not done so, this has placed the Court out of the direct reach of its 
citizens. As the case of Femi Falana v. African Union58 demonstrates, this is a hindrance to the 
activation of the jurisdiction of the Court over claims of violations of the right to development and 
other human rights protected by the African Charter. It is, however, possible for the African 
Commission to, as it were, take up cases to the court, in a sense, on behalf of the individuals and 
groups.   
The communications procedure of the African Commission is dealt with under Chapter III 
of the African Charter. The relevant provisions for our purpose are Articles 47, 48, 49 and 55 of 
the Charter. Article 47 allows a state party which has reasons to believe that another state party 
 
55 Supra note 47, see Article 3 Protocol of the African Court. 
56 Ibid, see Article 5.  
57 These include the following: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania, and 
Republic of Tunisia. See “African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (visited on 28 March 2020), online: 
<https://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/12-homepage1/1208-welcome-to-the-african-court1>. 
58 See Femi Falana v African Union (Application No. 001/2011), Judgment.  
has violated the provisions of the Charter, to draw the attention of the violating state to such 
violation by written communication which is also addressed to the Secretary-General of the AU 
and Chairman of the Commission. Where the matter is not resolved bilaterally by the two states, 
Article 48 allows either state to submit the matter to the Commission. Article 49 provides that a 
state may choose to by-pass the procedure in Article 47 and refer a matter directly to the 
Commission. The procedural rules regulating the communication process is contained in the Rules 
of Procedure 2010.59       
The landscape of the right to development as emergent from the jurisprudence of the 
African Commission can be seen in several communications it has treated. These include 
 
59 Supra note 44, see Rules 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 and 88 of the Rules of Procedure 2010.  
Bakweri,60 DRC,61 SERAC,62 Gumne,63 and Endorois.64 The Endorois case is particularly 
important because for the first time the African Commission was able to define the substantive 
nature of the right to development and what its violation entails. The case concerned the violation 
of freedom of conscience and religion, rights to property, culture, natural resources and the right 
to development of indigenous peoples. This occurred following the forced eviction of the Endorois 
(a pastoralist group) from their ancestral land at Lake Bogoria in central Kenya in the 1970s, to set 
up a national games reserve and tourist facilities.65 In examining the violation of the right to 
 
60 Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon (2004) (Communication No 260/02, AHRLR), 43. This involved a 
claim to historic lands on behalf of the traditional rulers, notables and elites of the indigenous minority Bakweri 
peoples of Cameroon before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights for violations of various 
provisions of the African Charter by a state-owned agro-industrial corporation, the Cameroon Development 
Corporation. The communication was grounded on the violation of the right to have the cause heard, the right to 
property, wealth and natural resources as well as the violation of the right to development. Unfortunately, the case did 
not proceed beyond the admissibility phase because the Commission came to the conclusion that the applicants had 
not exhausted local remedies. See supra note 33 at 205; see also Kofele N. Kale “Asserting Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Ancestral Lands: The Bakweri Land Litigation Against Cameroon” (2007) 13:1 Annual Survey of International 
& Comparative Law 103 at 107 (“Kale”).   
61 Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda (hereafter “DRC case”) Comm 227/99: 20th Annual 
Activity Report of the African Commission, annex IV, 111. This was the first case the African Commission had to 
deal with the merits. It concerned a complaint lodged by DRC against Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda concerning an 
alleged military assault by these states when they invaded its eastern border provinces and committed mass violations 
of human rights and international law. Amongst other things, the Commission equated the killings and barbaric acts 
against the Congolese people to a violation of their right to cultural development. The Commission also saw a direct 
link between the right to wealth and national resources and the right to development. See supra note 33 at 205.   
62 Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria (hereafter 
“SERAC case”) Comm 155/96 of 2001 AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). This case concerns the communication brought 
by two NGOs before the African Commission on behalf of the Ogoni people against Nigeria concerning contracts for 
oil exploration on their land. They alleged inter alia, the violation of the right not to be discriminated against and 
violation of the right to life, property, health, a family, wealth and natural resources and a satisfactory environment. 
The African Commission agreed with the complainants that the various rights they alleged had indeed been violated. 
Although the Commission found the violation of the right to development, it was not contained in its ruling. See supra 
note 33 at 207. 
63 Kevin Mgwanga Gumne et al v Cameroon (hereafter “Gumne”) Comm 266/2003: 26th Annual Activity Report of 
the African Commission, annex IV – This case involved a complaint by 14 individuals on behalf of the people of 
Southern Cameroon against the Republic of Cameroon alleging violations of numerous rights including the right to 
self-determination, wealth and natural resources and the right to development. The African Commission concluded 
that there was no violation of the right to development because natural resources are scarce in Cameroon as in any 
developing country and the government of Cameroon had provided explanations and statistical data showing how 
resources were being allocated in Southern Cameroon. See supra note 33 at 207-208.  
64 Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) (on behalf of the Endorois) v Kenya (hereafter “Endorois 
case”) Comm 276/2003: 27th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission 2009, annex 5.  
65 For an extensive discussion of this case see Serges A.D Kamga, “The Right to Development in the African Human 
Rights System: The Endorois Case” (2011) De Jure 381.  
development alleged, the African Commission found that lack of “meaningful participation”66 by 
the Endorois people who “were informed of the impending project [on their land] as a fait 
accompli”67 was a violation of their right to development. The Commission also found that the 
right to development was violated as a result of the encroachment upon the Endorois peoples’ 
choices and capabilities.68 As Serges Kamga argues, relying on Amartya Sen, “put differently, the 
right to development is underpinned by empowerment and freedom of the beneficiaries.”69      
To sum up this section, although the African Charter remains the only international instrument (so 
far) with a firm hard law guarantee of the right to development,70 the mechanisms available in the 
African human rights system for ensuring the accountability of states for the implementation of 
that right could still be bolstered in order to optimize their positive effect on the realization of this 
right.     
IV. Implementation of the Right to Development in the International System and the 
Difficult Problem of Accountability     
      
Even though, as already discussed, there is now widespread recognition – albeit with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm – of the right to development, there remains insufficient consensus on the 
nature of commitments required of states to implement the right. In large part, this is the legacy of 
the polarity that characterised the emergence of the right in the 1970s. Advocacy from the Global 
South for a New International Economic Order (“NIEO”) in the early 1970s71 marked the earliest 
push for the recalibration of the global economic system to accommodate the South based on 
 
66 Supra note 3, see Art. 2(3) of the Declaration.  
67 Supra note 64 at 281. 
68 Supra note 66 at 382. 
69 Ibid; see also Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 35. 
70 The provision of Art. 17 of the OAS Charter has been shown to be a very limited right to development in that it is 
a right which belongs to the state and not individuals in the Inter-American Human Rights System.   
71 For a concise history of the NIEO movement see supra note 4 at 876. 
principles of self-determination and the right of people to freely pursue their economic, social, and 
cultural development.72 Subsequent claims made largely from the Global South regarding the 
existence and need to formally recognize a right to development also greatly polarized scholars 
and policy makers largely along a South/North axis. Two conceptually opposed stances soon 
developed.  As Bonny Ibhawoh rightly argues (on the “uses and misuses of human rights talk”73), 
Southern states deployed the right to development as a “rhetoric of opposition” to challenge “the 
orthodoxies and hegemonies of the global political economy”74 while at the same time tending to 
eschew scrutiny of their own domestic records of human rights violations and the economic 
disempowerment of their local populations.75  
All-too-many Northern states, on the other hand, repackaged the right to development 
(from its original mould in the DRD) and deployed it to serve the interests of existing power 
structures in the global political economy. The dominant Northern approach has led to the 
supplanting of the more transformative kind of Southern discourses – considered too disruptive of 
the international status quo – with a rather tamer (and allegedly more benign and tolerable) “rights-
based development” approach. The rights-based development approach of the North tends to over-
emphasize state (read Global South state) right to development obligations and accountability, 
while under-emphasizing, and at times even obscuring, transnational and international obligations 
and accountability.76 While this approach correctly calls upon Southern states to promote good 
 
72 See Ibhawoh, supra note 2; Supra note 4.  
73 See Ibhawoh, supra note 2 at 79. 
74 Ibid at 89. 
75 Ibid at 78/79. This is a phenomenon which Bonny Ibhawoh fittingly describes as “the paradox of the right to 
development talk”. He uses the examples of China and South Africa to illustrate this paradox. Chinese officials for 
instance invoke the right to development to demand more favourable trade terms but also use it to deflect criticisms 
of its human rights record, or to resist pressure to cap environmental emissions. South African officials on the other 
hand invoke the right in demanding radical changes in international pharmaceutical patent laws while using it to also 
rationalize their failure to demand political reforms in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.  
76 Ibid at 98. 
governance and eschew corruption and other practices that hinder the enjoyment of the right to 
development by local populations, it is rather too silent on the corresponding obligations placed 
by the DRD on others in the international community, to open up spaces for the “fundamental 
reshuffling of [the] cards of power, or [the] redistribution of international resources worldwide.”77  
This section therefore examines these contradictory discourses on the right to development in the 
international system and enquires firstly, whether the rhetoric of opposition deployed by Southern 
states in support of claims of a right to development has served more to shield than advance 
accountability for the implementation of the right in their domestic systems. Secondly, whether 
Northern states and the international institutions they control, have in truth imbibed enough of the 
values of accountability which they frequently espouse in their encounters with Southern states 
over the fulfilment of the right to development. Thirdly, whether it is possible to redefine the 
agenda of the realization of the right to development to meet the challenges confronting the 
international community post-2015, and if so, how this can be achieved.  
(a) Unpacking the Dominant Southern Rhetoric on the Right to Development 
We argue here that the dominant discourse from the Global South on the realization of the right to 
development has a number of salient features: firstly, these states have (for historically 
understandable reasons) exhibited the tendency to emphasize this right as flowing from the right 
to self-determination or as having the same character as this latter right. Secondly, these states 
have somewhat understandably (if still problematically) tended to prioritize the developmental 
right over other rights. Thirdly, too-many (but certainly not all) states of the geo-political South 
have historically used claims as to the urgent need to realize the right to development as a way of 
 
77 Ibid. 
strengthening state and regime power to the detriment of individual or community empowerment; 
and fourthly is the reluctance of some states in the Global South to accept responsibility for the 
implementation of the right to development. While the items on this list of features are by no means 
exhaustive, they deserve closer scrutiny.  
The right to development as an extension of the right to self-determination   
The global political changes of the 1950s and 1960s (which followed the process of 
decolonization) were highly influential in shaping the tenor of the discourse on the right to 
development. This period witnessed the emergence of demands by the newly independent states 
of the South for a restructuring of the global political economy on the principles of self-
determination and the right of people to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural 
development.78 As a result of the closeness in time to the anti-colonial struggles of mid-to-late 
1900s of the movements of resistance against the economic hegemony of the North,79 claims about 
the existence of a right to development have often been regarded (by most states in the South) as 
a continuation of earlier claims of the existence of a right to self-determination. The significance 
of this parallel stems from the essential character of the right to self-determination as a right which 
channelled “resentment over the negative consequences of colonialism” and strengthened demands 
for “reparations”80 for such colonial harms by newly independent states of the South. It was 
essentially an insistence that “greater attention be paid to economic and social rights and that 
colonialism – and neo-colonialism – were gross violations of international law” for which “the 
 
78 Ibid at 90; see also supra note 29 at 867;  Mesenbet A. Tadeg, “Reflections on the Right to Development: Challenges 
and Prospects” (2010) 10 African Human Rights L J 325; Noel G. Villaroman, “Rescuing a Troubled Concept: An 
Alternative View of the Right to Development” (2011) 85 Philippine LJ 140.   
79 The movement of resistance here refers to the decolonization struggle, the advocacy for a New International 
Economic Order and the clamour for the recognition of the right to development.  
80 Nsongurua J. Udombana, “The Third World and the Right to Development: Agenda for the Next Millennium” 
(2000) 22:3 Hum Rts Q 753 at 763. 
imperialist world had a legally binding obligation” to redress by putting in place “some form of 
development cooperation”.81 This was the deep linkage that the leaders and indeed most peoples 
of the states of the South easily appreciated.                         
The right to development as superior to other rights  
 Although not always evident (or widely accepted), there is a sense in which the right to 
development was and is still sometimes portrayed by many Global South actors as superior to 
other human rights (especially civil and political rights). This is an approach that was in the past 
often favoured by states with a poor record of action in protecting human rights. Perhaps the 
“strongest arguments for prioritizing development rights” over other rights “has come from China 
in ways reflecting the old ‘Asian values’ debate”.82 As stated by the 1991 Chinese Government 
White Paper on Human Rights: “It is a simple truth that, for any country or nation, the right to 
subsistence is the most important of all human rights, without which the other rights are out of the 
question.”83 Given the lived reality of all-too-many Southern states, this approach is not necessarily 
as problematic as it may seem at first sight. For, in the living international human rights law/praxis, 
some prioritization of rights is inevitable in the interest of national development, national security, 
and so on. But, while, the priority that should be attached to development is – to us – not in doubt, 
one need not flatly and inflexibly subordinate other rights to it to accord it such – often sorely 
needed – emphasis. 
 
81 Ibid; see also Philip Alston, “Revitalising United Nations Work on Human Rights and Development” (1992) 18 
MELE. U.L. REV 216 at 218. 
82 See Ibhawoh, supra note 2; For a discussion of the Asian values debate see Xiarong Li, “‘Asian Values’ and the 
Universality of Human Rights” in P. Hayden (ed) The Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul: Paragon House, 2001) 
at 397 (“Li”). 
83 Central Government of the People’s Republic of China, Whitepaper on Human Rights (1991), chapter 1. 
The right to development and regime power  
The right to development features prominently as one strategy that has been deployed by some in 
the Global South to help with their attempts to preserve their own regime power. Referring to the 
Chinese example once more, official Chinese discourse on the right to development appears to 
tend to aim to strengthen the state and regime, at times at the expense of community and individual 
empowerment.84 Others have pointed out the tendency in these discourses to collapse 
“community” into the state, and the state into the current regime.85 This kind of tendency also 
characterizes the discourse of some other states of the South, and mirror the kind of anti-individual 
rights national security rhetoric that is prevalent in all-too-many other states, including the USA.     
Reluctant assumption of responsibility for implementation  
Although the African Charter holds the enviable position of being the only international treaty 
with a hard law guarantee of the right to development, the analysis of the enforcement of that right 
in the African human rights system suggests that there remains much room for improvement in the 
records of implementation of the right to development of the (African) states parties to that treaty. 
To be clear, developments at the African Commission with respect to the robust interpretation and 
application of the tight to development guaranteed in Article 22 of the African Charter, via their 
utilization of the African Commission’s communications procedure have been quite promising. 
However, it is telling that all other mechanisms in the African human rights system for ensuring 
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subsistence and development”. Rejecting the conventional wisdom that the individual is at the center of collective 
well-being, the Chinese delegation to the UNCHR in 1992 stressed that the right to development is a “collective right, 
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85 Supra note 82 (Li). 
individual and collective accountability by states for the implementation of the right to 
development have not been well utilized in the efforts to realize this right on the African continent. 
The extent to which human development has in fact occurred on the continent has also been 
suboptimal. This state of affairs is argued to be symptomatic of a deeper problem, namely, the 
reluctance of too many (and not by any means all) African states to accept primary responsibility 
for the implementation of the right to development.  
(b) Deconstructing the Opposition of Most Northern States to the Right to Development 
Northern states (and the many international institutions they more or less effectively control in 
practice) have engaged a different kind of rhetoric – the deployment of the “language of power”86 
– in their encounter/struggle with Southern states over the realization of the right to development. 
There are two aspects to this language of power. The first is the denial of the very existence of a 
right to development in international law; or in the alternative, reframing the content of that right 
to shift the vast majority of the responsibility for its implementation to Southern states.  
The Denial of the existence of the right to development  
The initial response of the North to Southern claims of the existence of a right to development was 
outright denial. The likes of the otherwise fair-minded US Scholar, Jack Donnelly, typified this 
response. Donnelly compared claims about the right to development to the search for a non-
existent black cat on a moonless night in a dark room.87 At the adoption of the DRD, many 
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15 Cal W Int’ LJ 473. 
Northern states did not support the declaration.88 Critics described the right as “catastrophic”89 and 
politically and practically a “total failure”.90 However, this form of Northern resistance to the right 
has since given way to forms of qualified acceptance. As we have seen,  armed with the power and 
influence they wield in the global political economy, Northern states have led the fashioning of an 
alternative “rights-based development” approach to supplant the allegedly far more disruptive 
claims (by the South) of the need to codify and realize a right to development.  A key sticking 
point for many regarding the rights-based development approach is that its concern is not so much 
with the goals of development, but with the normative framework within which it is articulated.91    
   The ‘Rights-based’ development approach: an alternative vision of the right to 
development?  
Since the 1990s international institutions, UN-affiliated and bilateral agencies and many NGOs in 
the North have adopted a “human rights approach to development” as their official policy.92 This 
approach sets the achievement of human rights as an objective of development by utilising thinking 
about human rights as the scaffolding of development policy.93 Competing understandings of the 
rights-based approach abound “in ethical debates about social justice and in conceptual 
disagreements over the meaning of core terms such as rights, development and accountability.”94 
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92 See Andre Frankovits, “Introduction: A Rights-Based Approach to Development and the Right to Development” 
(2002) Human Rights Development Yearbook 3.   
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For instance, the World Bank makes the attainment of human rights a goal of development95 
whereas the United Nations Development Programme asserts the opposite, insisting that human 
rights are critical to achieving development and should not be considered a reward for it.96 The 
rights-based development approach embraces a state-centric interpretation of the right to 
development. It treats the state as the central actor in achieving the right to development and holds 
the state accountable for development (or the lack thereof) under international law.97 Whatever be 
the case, this rights-based development framework is of greater appeal to the North whose 
opposition to the right to development hinges on two critical points: firstly, the assumption that 
the global redistributive justice framework undergirding the right to development is incompatible 
with the overly individual-centred, free market and capitalist, structure of the existing, Western-
dominated, global economy;98 secondly, the supposition that the very notion of framing 
development as a human rights entitlement with binding obligations (and even worse, binding 
extraterritorial obligations), is somehow inherently flawed.99          
(c) The Right to Development: Redefining the Agenda 
As should be evident now, the not fully resolved South-North debate about the right to 
development100 casts the HLPR, the UN Secretary-General’s Report, and even the recently adopted 
SDGs, respectively, in very important light – as an attempt to redefine the agenda on the right to 
development post-2015. From whichever perspective it is considered, the controversy about the 
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right to development boils down to the question of obligation and accountability in the 
implementation of the right. While the South wants the formal legal as well as substantive burden 
to be borne to a far more significant extent by the North (and the international institutions they 
control), the North has almost always insisted on the vast formal and substantive responsibility of 
Southern states for the realization of this right.  
It was for this reason that the focus of the HLPR on building consensus on implementation 
and accountability for the right to development,101 and the concomitant focus of the UN Secretary-
General’s Report on mobilizing means of implementation and “a participatory monitoring 
framework for tracking progress and mutual accountability mechanisms for all stakeholders”102 
held the promise of a fresh breath of life for the right to development. As we have noted, it is rather 
unfortunate that, while it did emphasise domestic accountability, the SDG document recently 
adopted by the UN regressed rather than progressed in this regard, and does precious little, if 
anything at all, to advance the quest for international accountability in the implementation of the 
right to development. 
This aside, and assuming the necessary political consensus can ever emerge in the direction 
of instituting meaningful international accountability, another troubling question remains: What 
kind of international legal instrument is best suited? Would a treaty (in the mould of the African 
Charter) or a declaration (in the mould of the DRD) be best suited for the task? Apart from these 
obvious categories are there any in-between forms of law which can assist the UN and indeed the 
entire international community actualise the aspirations captured by these reports post-2015? A 
suggestion was put forth in the HLPR that the goals and targets set out in the report should (like 
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the MDGs) “not be legally binding but must be monitored closely”.103 There are obvious 
challenges with this suggestion. Not the least is the fact that a non-binding set of goals would result 
in business being done in exactly the same way that it has been done – with little success – in the 
past several decades, whilst expecting a different result to materialize! The next section deals with 
this issue more closely.  
V. The “Wonderful Artificiality” of Law          
Martii Koskenniemi writes about “the wonderful artificiality of states.”104 Inspired by this turn of 
phrase, we have coined the phrase “the wonderful artificiality of law” for use in the present context. 
Essentially what Koskenniemi argues is that in spite of its perceived shortcomings, the state 
remains an important site for moulding “the social reality in which we live”.105 It provides “a prior 
system of decision” required to “sort out priorities and hierarchies and to adjust conflicting 
values”.106 Koskenniemi appears to suggest that the state can lend itself to many purposes and in 
this sense, overcomes the shortcomings of other visions for organising society like the creation of 
“non-state self-defense communities.”107 It is in this sense that we have borrowed from 
Koskenniemi in our ideation of the “wonderful artificiality of law”. 
As most international lawyers recognize, there is a spectrum of legal norms, from soft law, 
through several in-between forms of law, to hard law. In the area of the implementation of the right 
to development, many of the contributors to the important edited collection jointly published over 
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a decade ago by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Harvard School of Public Health 
recognize this reality in a very clear way.108 Whilst not discounting the imperative need for hard 
law to be deployed in the service of the effort to realize the right to development, the early work 
of one of us on the right to development argues in favour of the value that the technically non-
binding DRD still brings to the table, despite its status as a non-hard law text.109 The point here is 
that there is a spectrum of bindingness of legal norms and that, while even those norms that are 
low in that traditional “hierarchy” can still be useful in the real world, we would much prefer the 
deployment of hard international law specifically enunciating the right to development.  
  For, the framing and naming of a norm as something called “law” is almost never an idle 
exercise and is hardly ever inconsequential. At a minimum, classifying a violation as a violation 
of law takes away from relevant actors the often-heard excuse that they will not comply with a 
norm because it is non-binding. Law limits the field of argument available to the actors addressed 
by a norm and constricts the size of the ballpark within which they can play. In this way does it 
strengthens the hands of those who would demand the vindication of the relevant norm. In sum, 
hard law matters! This is exactly why all-too-many actors on the global level have historically 
resisted the classification of the right to development as a legal norm. And that is why the 
widespread tendency today is to subject the most heinous or egregious international crimes to hard 
law norms and processes and not merely to non-law or soft law norms. For example, most people 
would tend to be shocked by an argument that those who commit the most serious crimes against 
humanity should be exclusively dealt with through soft law or non-law norms and mechanisms. 
Interestingly, in the international criminal law realm, there is now a kind of graduated and 
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calibrated scale of responsibility and accountability in which the more heinous the international 
crime and the more responsible for it one is, the more there is a tendency to use hard law to deal 
with it. 
A broad analogy with international criminal law would suggest that if we take the task of 
bringing an end to politically and socio-economically produced extreme poverty as seriously as 
we ought to; and do really see the post-2015 development agenda as a way to bring it to an end, 
(as do the High Level Panel and the Secretary General); then a similar kind of graduated and 
calibrated scale of responsibility and accountability might be in order in the realm of the 
international law of development. This approach will likely strengthen the accountability 
mechanisms correctly suggested by the High Level Panel and the Secretary-General, and 
disappointingly betrayed and discarded (yet again) during the final negotiations leading up to the 
adoption of the SDGs. 
For example, we can as a first step identify a very small core (or umbra) of the most 
egregious or serious violations of the right to development and deploy hard law norms and 
mechanisms to advance greater compliance with these norms. One way of doing so is to include 
these core violations either in a new treaty (as is likely to be done soon at the UN), or in a new 
Protocol to the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. In this respect, Article 22 of 
the African Charter and the increasing number of interesting decisions which have interpreted and 
applied it to real life situations are a kind of avatar.110  
As a second step, we can then identify for inclusion in the penumbra a larger set of violations of 
the right to development which may be suitably dealt with in softer ways, including in some of the 
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ways canvassed in the FES/Harvard edited collection (such as enhancing the status of the 
Declaration on the Right to Development, preparing new guidelines or compacts for implementing 
that right, establishing a standing commission, and mainstreaming the right into the Universal 
Periodic Review process). The methods of peer-review, monitoring and tracking proposed by the 
High Level Panel, or by the Secretary-General’s Report, are of course still highly relevant in this 
respect, and perhaps even more significant.  
More reflection and work is of course needed to firm this idea up, but pointers already exist in the 
relevant literature111 as to what kinds of violations of the right to development ought to be dealt 
with via hard law instruments and mechanism and what should rather be dealt with through non-
law or soft law norms and processes.  
All in all, what should be kept in mind is that, as the wise Canadian thinker and diplomat Ivan 
Leigh Head once noted, an element of law, some measure of it, will be needed in the effort to 
realize the right to development.112 
VI. Conclusion          
In this paper we have examined the situation of the right to development in the African and 
international human rights system. Our analysis focused principally on accountability for the 
implementation of the right. Forming the backdrop of our paper is the report of the High Level 
Panel commissioned by the UN (which was followed by a report by the UN Secretary-General) 
outlining five big transformative shifts that need to take place post-2015 in order to achieve better 
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implementation of the right to development; as well as the recently adopted SDG document. A 
major theme that runs through the reports that preceded the adoption of the SDGs is the question 
of accountability for the right to development. The reports agree on the need for participatory 
monitoring mechanisms for ensuring mutual accountability by all stakeholders for the 
implementation of the right.  
However, they recommend that a legally non-binding instrument (just like the case with 
the MDGs) should be adopted to secure these aspirations. The SDGs, as we have shown, do even 
less about advancing legal accountability for the implementation of the right to development. We 
have argued, however, for the consideration of a wide variety of legal forms, ranging from hard 
law instruments (like the draft treaty that is currently being considered by the UN) to in-between 
forms of law and non-law forms as vehicles for ensuring that all actors and stakeholders in the 
international community are made accountable for this right. We have also argued that law being 
an artificial device, can be malleable and made to achieve any purpose provided the objectives 
being pursued are clarified from the outset. All in all, the idea is not to repeat the mistakes of the 
past and yet expect a different result. Sadly, this seems to be the track that the recently adopted 
SDG framework did (yet again) put us on. However, given the recent developments at the UN 
(regarding the development and impending adoption of a draft treaty and the establishment of an 
Expert Mechanism on the RTD), hope, it seems, must spring eternal!  
 
 
 
 
